A sample of Ndungu

I had a 50-pager for this guy my freshman year, but between then and now, my computer crashed and I lost it. Disappointing.

This is the demi-intro for a final paper in Ndungu's Comparative Politics class, Spring 2007.

In the interest of providing a solution for the state of disarray in Iraq, it would be prudent to turn to two models. Japan and Germany have both recovered remarkably well from their war-torn status in 1945, reconstructing the rubble to the tune of the world’s second largest economy, in Japan’s case (Hauss online 3) and a GNP per capita of roughly $23,000 in Germany (Hauss 144). But what element of this successful growth can be applied to Iraq’s stagnant progress? Both Japan and Germany have adapted systems of economic decision-making that, while relatively representative, are closed to public participation. The remaining question will be whether Iraq ought to adapt a similar system of political decision –making.
Nary an observer can reasonably doubt the successful economic implications of a policy guided by Japan’s “Iron Triangle” – the system of peak associations in which civil servants, corporate executives, and politicians from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party are informally but intangibly linked in the process of policy determination (Hauss online 24-25). In a process that has been dubbed “state-led capitalism” (Hauss online 27), corporate executives, largely freed from overseas competition via high tariffs, can plan for long-term growth rather than short-term profiteering. What’s more, the state will subsidize domestic enterprises that show promise for potential growth and economic harvest (Hauss online 28). Such government control of the free market has proven cause for an economy that, despite a recent recession, has been the marvel of the international scene due to its rate of growth spanning the previous decades.
Yet the process functions of the political decision-making process in Japan have called into question the very notion of whether Japan is, in fact, a democracy. Indeed, Japan appears to follow the consensus model at best, having bred a citizenry that is encouraged to abandon individualism in favor of “groupism,” which “represents little more than an acceptance of arbitrary authority that allows elites to manipulate and dominate everything from public opinion to foreign markets” (Hauss online 14). Though other parties exits and control seats in the lower house of parliament (the Diet), the Liberal democratic Party has held nearly unwavering control of power since the mid 1950s (Hauss online 16).
Herein, within this system of political and economic decision-making that essentially disallows the uneducated masses from subverting progress, lies the potential answer for Iraq: by establishing a system of intense group loyalty, Japan has created patron-client relationships in which factions resulting from the country’s feudal past can spar at the highest levels of government, rather than sparring between the masses in the city streets. The elites, who are brought together due to business interests, are left to fight each other, rather than the people, and progress is not inhibited. Iraq, given the religious divide that is driving the violent civil conflict, would do well to adopt a similar system which is centralized in both the areas of political and economic decision-making. Stability is key.
Since the benefits of economic centralization are difficult to deny, at least for the short term, opponents would likely focus on the structure of political decision-making, opting instead for an open political system to accompany the closed economic process. The obvious example is Germany, whose corporatist economic process has been matched by an open, majoritarian, multi-party political society.
Germany’s corporatist economic decision-making process is most visible through “Concerted Action,” in which the Social Democratic party organized meetings between business, government, and labor officials from 1966 to 1977, with the original goal of ending the first major recession following World War II (Hauss 167). Though the formal ties, especially in the arena of macroeconomic policy, have been scaled back, informal ties between the bureaucracy and the business community remain largely intact (Hauss 167-168), including such facets as codetermination, in which unions are given half the seats on businesses’ boards of directors, which is largely considered a less adversarial model for business-labor relations than those typically found in other liberal democracies (Hauss 168). Germany’s banks have also, until very recently when the European Union’s central bank took over many of the Bundesbank’s functions, been key players in the determination of economic policy. Many argued that the Bundesbank was Germany’s most powerful political institution (Hauss 168). On the whole, the closed-door economic decision-making process has been met with undeniable success.
The major discrepancy between the German and Japanese models exists in terms of the political decision-making process. Opponents of the Japanese model would point out that, when economic policy is determined behind closed doors, the policies are not being determined by elected officials, and that the electoral connection between the people and policy, as a whole, is lost. Germany counters the Japanese model by providing for a more free and open political system in which multiple parties exist and power regularly switches hands. Moreover, the electoral system is designed in such a way that, though the dual system and single party district setup in the Bundestag (lower house) minimizes the number of new and small parties, gives the major parties incentives to appeal to as many voters as possible (Hauss 156-157). Even the smaller parties are given this incentive, to a degree: “Voters also cast a second ballot in which they choose from a list of candidates representing each of the parties. Seats are then allocated proportionally to all parties that win over 5 percent of the vote” (Hauss 157).
As corporatist arrangements created affluence and economic success after the war, this growth and success undermined left-wing radicalism and right-wind fascism, in turn erasing the most divisive political factions – those that had the highest likelihood of impeding growth and development in the reconstruction era (Hauss 157). The parties attempted to appeal to moderate voters, which led to a more civil and successful process of political decision-making at the highest levels rather than leaving a void in which the people would take to the street. Stability was achieved nonetheless.
Such is the appeal of the German model in seeking to find a solution for the disarray in Iraq. The emergence of affluence undermined support for radical, progress-impeding factions, and the closed economic decision-making process described in both Germany and Japan give us reason to believe that a similar system would work for Iraq. Proponents of the social democratic theory would, however, advocate an open political process similar to that of Germany, as per the fact that stability was not subverted nor progress inhibited when affluence led to more moderate people who, in turn, essentially forced the parties to turn to moderation (Hauss 157). Unity was created via incentives for creating cooperation. What’s more, that unity was a unity based not on bloodlines or religion, but on professionalism and the interest of progress and affluence. This is where the U.S. failed in attempting to establish an open political system – in establishing a representative government, parties and seats were held under the title of different religions and sects of Islam – indeed, this only served to perpetuate the divisiveness of the Sunni-Shiite conflict that is currently ravaging the nation.
This is also where our primary concession lies. Though a more closed political system would certainly ensure stability and a civil decision-making process, Germany has proven that stability and progress is quite attainable, thanks to none other than the closed economic decision-making process that she and Japan have in common. What’s more, though we write in support of a closed system, it is undeniable that this must remain a solution only in the short run, lest the powerless remain exploited for an indeterminable period. It is only through dashes of social democracy (for example, free public education) that the liberal constitutionalist theory will prove successful in the long run. In order for long-term success, liberal constitutionalism cannot be a long-term feature of the political and economic landscape.